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Buffer overflows are the single largest cause of security attacks in recent times.
Attacks based on this vulnerability have been the subject of extensive research and
a significant number of defenses have been proposed for dealing with attacks of this
nature. However, despite this extensive research, buffer overflows continue to be
exploited due to the fact that many defenses proposed in prior research provide
only partial coverage and attackers have adopted to exploit problems that are not
well defended. The fact that many legacy binaries are still deployed in production
environments also contributes to the success of buffer overflow attacks since most, if
not all, buffer overflow defenses are source level defenses which require an application
to be re-compiled. For many legacy applications, this may not be possible since the
source code may no longer be available. In this thesis, we present an implementation
of a defense mechanism for defending against various attack forms due to buffer
overflows using binary rewriting. We study various attacks that happen in the real
world and present techniques that can be employed within a binary rewriter to
protect a binary from these attacks.
Binary rewriting is a nascent field and little research has been done regard-
ing the applications of binary rewriting. In particular, there is great potential for
applications of binary rewriting in software security. With a binary rewriter, a vul-
nerable application can be immediately secured without the need for access to it’s
source code which allows legacy binaries to be secured. Also, numerous attacks on
application software assume that application binaries are laid out in certain ways or
have certain characteristics. Our defense scheme implemented using binary rewrit-
ing technology can prevent many of these attacks. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of our scheme in preventing many different attack forms based on buffer overflows
on both synthetic benchmarks and real-world attacks.
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The dominant form of software security vulnerability is the buffer overflow
vulnerability. Attacks based on this vulnerability have been the subject of extensive
research and a significant number of defenses have been proposed for dealing with
attacks of this nature. Despite this extensive research, buffer overflows continue to
be exploited in real world attacks. This is because most buffer overflow defenses
provide only partial coverage, and the attacks have adopted to exploit problems
that are not well defended.
Numerous schemes have been proposed for dealing with buffer overflow attacks.
In our eyes, the applicability of such schemes depends on a number of factors,
including:
1. Ease of use
2. Availability
3. Robustness
4. Applicability to all binaries
5. Low overheads
In this thesis, we present a scheme which meets the applicability requirements
for a good security scheme. Our scheme is implemented using a binary rewriter
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developed within our research group named SecondWrite. A binary rewriter takes a
binary executable program as input, and produces a modified, improved executable
as output.
Two of the novel aspects of SecondWrite are: 1) the input binary is translated
into an existing compiler’s intermediate representation (IR); and 2) binaries without
relocation or symbolic information can be rewritten.
The ability to translate a binary to a high-level IR allows SecondWrite to insert
security mechanisms that would otherwise require access to source code. Using a
rewriter to insert security in a binary is important for consumers/users of software,
who are otherwise at the mercy of the vendor when it comes to using security
mechanisms or fixing known problems (patch management). With a binary rewriter,
an administrator can (in principle) modify a binary to fix or mitigate a vulnerability.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are primarily in demonstrating a key applica-
tion of binary rewriting. To this end, this thesis makes two major contributions:
1. A scheme is presented for protecting against commong buffer overflow attacks
using a sophisticated and novel static binary rewriter
2. The scheme presented is practical, effective, and immediately deployable
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1.2 Outline
In Chapter 2, we discuss some of the common attack forms and survey existing
defenses for these attacks. We also briefly discuss some previous work in the field of
binary rewriting. In Chapter 3, we describe how our binary rewriter works and how
the various components of our scheme are implemented. In Chapter 4, we present
experimental results which demonstrate the practicality of our scheme. Finally, in




Our work is related to many techniques that attempt to defend against ma-
licious applications and vulnerabilities in applications which present attackers with
an opportunity to attack. In this chapter, we elaborate on some of the pieces of work
most closely related to ours. First, we present the various attack techniques utilized
by attackers that are relevant for this thesis and then we go on to present vari-
ous techniques proposed for mitigating these attack techniques. When discussing
defenses, we draw attention to the drawbacks of each technique. We also briefly
discuss related work in binary rewriting.
2.1 Catalog of Attack Techniques
2.1.1 Buffer Overflow Attacks
A buffer overflow refers to a situation that can occur when a function contains a
local bounded array, or buffer, and writes into that buffer are not correctly guarded.
Since C and C++ compilers typically use the stack for local variables as well as
parameters, frame pointers, and saved return addresses, writes into a buffer that
are not correctly guarded may overwrite and corrupt the return address stored on
the stack. Data copied into the buffer whose length is larger than the buffer’s size
is referred to as a buffer overflow.
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If an attacker controls the data used by the function, attackers can exploit
buffer overflows and change the function’s return address to an arbitrary value. In
this case, when the function returns, the attacker can direct execution to code of
their choice. This technique was first described in detail by AlephOne in 1996 [15].
However, attacks of this kind date back to before 1988 when the technique was used
in the fingerd exploit of the Morris worm.
An example of a function with a buffer overflow vulnerability adopted from [8]
follows:







The above (somewhat unrealistic) function compares the concatentation of
two input strings against /home/posulliv/my file. If the input strings to the above
function can be chosen by an attacker, then the attacker can change the program’s
flow of control by overflowing the tmp buffer and changing the return address stored
on the stack to an address of the attacker’s choosing.
Commonly, an attacker would choose their input data so that the machine code
for an attack payload would be present at the modified return address. When the
vulnerable function returns, and execution of the attack payload begins, the attacker
has gained control of the behavior of the target software. The attack payload is often
called shellcode, since a common goal of an attacker is to launch a command line
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interpreter (referred to as a shell in UNIX like environments) under their control.
2.1.2 Return-to-libc Attacks
As an alternative to supplying executable code (referred to as direct code in-
jection), an attacker might be able to craft an attack that executes existing machine
code (indirect code injection). This class of attacks has been referred to as jump-
to-libc or return-to-libc (arc injection [6] has also been used to refer to this class of
attacks) because the attack often involves directing execution towards machine code
in the standard C library (libc) [6]. The standard C library is often the target for
attacks of this type since it is loaded in nearly every UNIX program and it contains
routines of the sort that are useful for an attacker. This technique was first suggested
by Solar Designer in 1997 [7]. Attacks of this kind can evade defense mechanisms
that protect the stack such as stack canaries and it is also effective against defenses
that only allow memory to be writable or executable.
An example of a function vulnerable to such an attack adopted from [8] follows:
int median(int *data, int len, void *cmp)
{
int tmp[MAX_INTS];
/* copy the input integers */
memcpy(tmp, data, len * sizeof(int));
/* sort the local copy */
qsort(tmp, len, sizeof(int), cmp);
/* median is in the middle */
return tmp[len / 2];
}
The above function is vulnerable to a buffer overflow as outlined in the previous
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sub-section. However, an attacker can also corrupt the comparison function pointer
cmp before it is passed to the qsort library function. If an attacker is able to
accomplish this, he/she can gain control of execution at the point where the qsort
function calls its copy of the corrupted cmp argument.
Traditionally, attacks of this kind have targeted the system function in the
standard system library which allows the execution of an arbitrary command with
arguments. However, recent attacks have been demonstrated which do not depend
on calling functions in the standard C library.
2.1.3 Return-Orientated Programming
The technique of return-oreintated programming was introduced by Shacham
[19]. Using this technique, an attacker can induce arbitrary behavior in a pro-
gram whose control flow he/she has diverted without injecting any code. A return-
orientated program chains together short instruction sequences already present in
a program’s address space, each of which ends in a return instruction. Several
instructions can be combined into a gadget which is the basic block within a return-
orientated program that performs operations. Gadgets are self-contained and per-
form one well-defined step of a computation. An attacker uses these gadgets to craft
stack frames that can then perform arbitrary computations.
Shacham et al. [3] showed that the standard C library in both Linux running
on the x86 platform and Solaris running on the SPARC platform contain enough
useful intructions to construct meaningful gadgets. They manually analyzed the
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standard C library on both platforms and constructed a library of gadgets that is
Turing complete.
2.2 Catalog of Defense Techniques
2.2.1 Compile Time Defenses
StackGuard [4] places a ’canary’ on the stack between local variables and
the return address. This canary value is designed to warn of stack corruption since
validating the integrity of the canary value is an effective means of ensuring that the
function return address has not been corrupted. Microsoft’s compiler also supports
the insertion of stack canaries with the /GS option.
ProPolice [9] is similar to StackGuard in that it places a canary value on the
stack. However, ProPolice also places arrays and other function-local buffers above
all other function-local variables on the stack. Copies of all function arguments are
also made into new, function-local variables that also sit below any buffers in the
function. As a result, these variables and arguments are not subject to corruption
through an overflow of these buffers.
StackGuard, PointGuard, and ProPolice involve compile-time analysis and
transformation. Thus, unless the source code for an application is available, these
techniques can not be used thereby hindering the ability to easily deploy these
techniques. Our techniques do not suffer from this drawback since they can be
easily deployed on any binary produced from any source language and compiler.
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2.2.2 Instruction Set Randomization
Instruction-set randomization [1] is a promising technique for protecting against
buffer overflows (and many kinds of code injection attacks). This approach random-
izes the underlying system’s instructions so that foreign code injected by an attacker
would fail to execute correctly since the attacker does not know the instruction set of
the target system. However, as mentioned by the authors in [1], the main drawback
of this technique as applied to binary code that is meant to execute on a hard-
ware processor is the need for special support by the processor. Thus, even though
instruction-set randomization offers a strong defense against buffer overflow attacks
the fact that unless it is supported by specialized hardware, it incurs significant
overheads means that it is inlikely to see adoption in practice for the foreseeable
future. However, when applied to interpreted languages (such as SQL), it can prove
to be very effective. However, interpreted languages are not vulnerable to the buffer
overflow attacks being discussed in this thesis.
In [12], the authors utilized Strata and Diablo to implement instruction set
randomization. Diablo is used to prepare a binary for string encryption and in-
troduce the information necessary to detect foreign code. Strata is then used to
provide the necessary virtual execution environment for safe execution. The main
contribution of this work is that the instruction-set randomization implementation
is efficient while requiring no special hardware support. However, the runtime over-
heads reported are still high and likely to limit the practical adoption of such a
system.
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A binary rewriter such as the one used for our research suffers from none of
these issues. No special hardware is required in order to utilize a binary rewriter
and overheads are relatively low. In fact, if an original binary was compiled without
optimizations, it is likely to see a runtime improvement when rewritten.
2.2.3 Address Space Layout Randomization
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) can be seen as a relatively
coarse grained form of software diversity [21]. ASLR shuffles, or randomizes, the
layout of software in the memory address space. It is effective at preventing remote
attackers that have no existing means of running code on a target system from
crafting attacks that depend on addresses. ASLR is not intended to defend against
attackers that are able to control the software execution and its utility on 32-bit
architectures is limited by the number of bits available for address randomization
[20].
A binary rewriter could easily be used to provide a similar defense mechanism
as ASLR. In fact, an interesting future avenue of research is to investigate software
diversity through binary rewriting.
2.2.4 Control Flow Integrity
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) [13] is a basic safety property that can prevent
attacks from arbitrarily controlling program behavior. CFI dictates that software
execution must follow a path of a control-flow graph that is determined ahead of time
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by analysis (in this case, static binary analysis is performed). CFI is enforced using
static verification and binary rewriting (with Microsoft’s Vulcan tool) that instru-
ments software with runtime checks. These checks aim to ensure that control flow
remains within a given control-flow-graph. CFI is a very effective defense against
buffer overflow attacks (and any attack which attempts to change a program’s con-
trol flow) since any attempt by an attacker to divert the control flow of a program
will be caught by CFI. However, the main barrier to CFI’s adoption seems to be
the overhead associated with the scheme. In [13], the authors state that the average
overhead of CFI (as implemented by them) is 16% on the SPEC2000 benchmarks.
Also, the binary rewriter used by CFI depends on a binary being compiled with
debug information which may not always be available. If a binary is not compiled
with debug information then the implemenation of CFI in [13] cannot be utilized.
Our schemes implemented through our binary rewriter can provide the same
level of protection as CFI. An additional advantage of our scheme is that our binary
rewriter does not require access to any special information in an input binary unlike
the binary rewriter used in CFI which requires access to debug information.
2.2.5 Program Sheperding
Program sheperding employs an efficient machine-code interpreter (DynamoRIO
[2]) for implementing a security enforcement mechanism. A broad class of security
policies can be implemented using a machine interpreter such as DynamoRIO. For
example, DynamoRIO could be used to enforce control-flow integrity. Program
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shepherding enforces a similar policy that imposes certain runtime restrictions on
control flow such that an attacker can not alter a program’s flow of control.
Program sheperding can experience significant memory and runtime over-
heads, particularly on the Windows platform. The scheme requires an application
and interpreter to be run simultaneously. The high overheads in some cases are
likely to limit adoption of program sheperding.
2.3 Related Work in Binary Rewriting
Binary rewriting and link time optimizatizers have been considered by a num-
ber of researchers. Binary rewriting research is being carried out in two directions:
static rewriting and dynamic rewriting. Dynamic binary rewriters rewrite the binary
during its execution. Examples are PIN [5], BIRD [17], DynInst [11], DynamoRIO
[2] and Valgrind [14]. None of the dynamic binary rewriters we found employ a com-
piler like intermediate representation. This is not surprising since dynamic rewriters
construct their internal representation at run-time, and hence they would not have
the time to construct a compiler IR. Dynamic rewriters are hobbled since they do not
have enough time to perform complex compiler transformations either; they have
been primarily used for code instrumentation and simple security checks in the past.
We do not discuss dynamic rewriters further since the methods used for rewriting
in this thesis are primarily directed at static binary rewriters such as SecondWrite.
Existing static binary rewriters related to our approach include Etch [16],
ATOM [10], PLTO [18], and Diablo [22]. None of the existing rewriters employ a
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compiler level intermediate representation; rather they define their own low-level
custom intermediate representation. Diablo defines an augmented whole program
control-flow-graph based intermediate representation with program registers as glob-
als and memory as a black box. It does not attempt to obtain high-level information
like function prototypes and is geared mainly towards optimizations like code com-
paction. Taking memory as a black box limits its applicability to architectures like
x86 which have a limited set of registers. ATOM defines a symbolic RTL-based
intermediate representation with infinite registers but does not make any attempt
of analyzing or modifying the stack layout. Its mainly targeted towards RISC ar-
chitectures. PLTO employs a whole program CFG based IR and implements stack
analysis to determine the use-kill depths of each function. However, this information
is not used for converting it into high-level IR; rather it is only used for low-level
custom optimizations like load/store forwarding. Etch does not explicitly build an
intermediate representation build an intermediate representation and allows users
to add new tools to analyze binaries. The primary goal of Etch appears to be in-
strumentation and has only been shown to be applicable for simple optimizations
like profile-guided code layout.
2.4 Summary
Current defenses have a number of weaknesses:
• They are not easily deployable
– Source code for an application is required
13
– An application needs to be compiled with certain information
– Hardware support is required
• Most are not readily available for use and evaluation
• Some suffer from un-acceptable overheads
• No scheme is immediately applicable to all binaries
Using the novel binary rewriting techniques developed within our research
group, we have developed a scheme with the following characteristics:
• It is immediately deployable
• It is applicable to any binary
• Access to an application’s source code is not required
• An application does not need to be compiled in any way such that it contains
special information e.g. debug or relocation information
• It has low overheads
• Many common stack-based buffer overflow attacks are prevented
14
Chapter 3
Binary Rewriting and Our Protection Scheme
The cornerstone of our scheme is a binary rewriter which has been developed
within our research group. In this chapter, we first discuss binary rewriting, give an
overview of the binary rewriter we have developed in our research group, and then
go on to discuss the various components of our scheme that we have implemented
as part of our binary rewriter.
3.1 Binary Rewriting
Binary rewriters are pieces of software that accept a binary executable program
as input, and produce an improved executable as output. The output executable
typically has the same functionality as the input, but is improved in one or more
metrics, such as run-time, energy use, memory use, security or reliability.
In recognition of its potential, binary rewriting has seen much active research
over the last decade. The reason for great interest in this area is that binary rewriting
offers additional advantages over compiler-produced optimized binaries:
• Ability to do inter-procedural optimization. Although compilers in the-
ory can do whole-program optimizations, the reality is that they do little if
any. Many commercial compilers - even highly optimizing ones - limit them-
selves to separate compilation, where each file (and sometimes each function)
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is compiled in isolation. Inter-procedural link-time optimizations are often ab-
sent, and even when present, are usually far less powerful than compile-time
optimizations since they work on low-level object code without the benefit
of the extensive optimizations on IR available in the compiler. In contrast,
binary rewriters have access to the complete application all at once, including
libraries. This allows them to perform aggressive whole-program optimizations
to exceed the performance of even optimized code.
• Ability to do optimizations missed by the compiler. Some binaries,
especially legacy binaries or those compiled with inferior compilers, often
miss certain optimizations. Binary rewriters can perform these optimizations
missed by the compiler while preserving the optimizations the compiler did
actually perform.
• Increased economic feasibility. It is cheaper to implement a code transfor-
mation once for an instruction set in a binary rewriter, rather than repeatedly
for each compiler for the instruction set. For example, the ARM instruction
set has over 30 compilers available for it, and the x86 has a similarly large num-
ber of compilers from different vendors and for different source languages. The
high expense of repeated compiler implementation often cannot be supported
by a small fraction of the demand.
• Portable to any source language and any compiler. A binary rewriter
works for code produced from any source language by any compiler.
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• Works for hand-coded assembly routines. Code transformations cannot
be applied by a compiler to hand-coded assembly routines, since they are never
compiled. In contrast, a binary rewriter can transform such routines.
However, binary rewriters today have fallen far short of this desired vision.
Binary rewriters remain relatively crude tools today, capable of no more than simple
program transformations such as peephole optimization and code instrumentation.
Complex transformations such as extensive whole-program optimizations, automatic
parallelization and sophisticated security enforcement, which we study in this thesis,
remain outside the capabilities of current rewriters.
The binary rewriter developed by our group and utilized for this research
is named SecondWrite. Our binary rewriter employs the widely used open-source
LLVM compiler infrastructure and in particular, LLVM’s high-level intermediate
representation to represent code. Our custom binary reader and de-compiler mod-
ules read a binary and produce requivalent LLVM IR code using some of the tech-
niques we will briefly describe in Section 3.1.1.
For this thesis, we study using binary rewriting to retroactively add security
to a vulnerable binary. When this extra security is added, a binary is no longer
vulnerable to common buffer overflow attacks.
Two notable properties of using binary rewriting to enforce security are low-
overhead and real-time prevention of malicious behaviors as will be seen when we
























Figure 3.1: SecondWrite system
3.1.1 Architecture of Binary Rewriter
Figure 3.1 presents an overview of the SecondWrite system. The SecondWrite
system consists of a frontend module for reading binary executables and generating
an initial LLVM IR, an internal pass module for extracting more information about
the underlying program, optimizing passes to implement various optimizations, and
the LLVM code generator (codegen) for producing the rewritten binary.
The frontend module consists of a disassembler and a custom binary reader
which processes the individual instructions and generates an initial LLVM IR. This
initial representation is void of the desired IR features like function prototypes,
abstract stack and virtual registers. The internal pass module analyzes this initial
IR to obtain an improved IR which has all the information and features mentioned
previously. Various optimization passes can be written on the above IR to obtain
an optimized IR. Finally, the optimized IR is passed to the existing LLVM code
generator to obtain the rewritten binary.
Various inherent characteristics of executables such as the unavailability of
function prototypes, the use of a phyiscal stack and the use of the set of phyiscal
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registers make it difficult to obtain a high-level IR from an input executable. A
number of techniques have been developed within our group to extract this high-
level information from executables whenever possible. We will not discuss those
techniques in this thesis as the techniques are explained in detail elsewhere [].
3.2 Stack Canary Insertion
The first component of our scheme is the simplest. LLVM provides the ability
to insert stack canaries during code generation. Utilizing this capability from LLVM
allows us to easily provide the same level of protection to an un-protected binary as
StackGuard would provide when given an application’s source code.
Essentially, a random canary value is generated and placed on the stack during
a function’s prolog. In the function epilog, the value stored on the stack is compared
with the random canary value for this process. If there is any difference, execution
is halted as the canary value has been corrupted.
While this component of our scheme is simple, it demonstrates a key advantage
of SecondWrite. By translating the input binary to LLVM’s high-level intermediate
representation, we were able to take advantage of features LLVM already provides.
Thus, to achieve the same level of protection as StackGuard, we had to do very little
once the binary was translated to LLVM’s IR.
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3.3 Base Pointer Elimination
The next component of our scheme is again due to existing LLVM optimiza-
tions. LLVM is an optimizing compiler and the binaries produced by LLVM are
highly optimized. One common optimization applied by modern compilers on the
x86 platform is to free up the EBP register for register allocation by removing the
base (or frame) pointer.
Eliminating the base pointer also removes the ability for an attacker to craft
an attack by modifying the old base pointer stored in a stack frame. In a binary
which has not been compiled at a high optimization level, base pointers may still
be used. In this case, the value of the base pointer will be pushed on the stack
upon function entry in order for the value to be restored on function return. If an
attacker is able to modify the value of the base pointer, he/she could have a fake
stack frame they created be used thereby allowing the attacker to alter the flow of
control of the program.
When the base pointer is eliminated by LLVM, any attack of this form is
immediately prevented. There will be no base pointer for an attacker to modify.
While corruption of the stack may still occur if an attacker overflows a buffer in
order to attempt to overwrite the base pointer, no attack will be successful.
Again, the elimination of the base pointer highlights the advantages of Second-
Write. By utilizing an existing compiler framework, we are able to produce highly
optimized binaries which eliminate the ability for an attacker to perform an attack
on a base pointer.
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3.4 Return Address Protection
Given that stack canaries as inserted by LLVM do not provide the same level
of protection as the ProPolice mechanism that comes with GCC, we decided to
implement a more complete solution for protecting against corruption of the return
address.
The basic idea of our return address protection scheme is as follows:
1. During the function prolog, store the return address of the current function in
a global variable
2. In function epilog, compare the current return address on the stack with the
value saved in a global variable
3. If there is any difference between these values, execution is halted
This simple scheme will detect if the return address has been modified either
directly or indirectly. One complication with this scheme is the fact that a global
variable is used for storing the return address. If a separate global variable was
created for each function, memory overhead would become quite high. One solution
is to use an array of global variables of a bounded size for saving return values.
However, if function nesting is deep as in recursive functions, issues can still occur.
We applied an optimization for relieving this problem. We observed that this
protection mechanism is only necessary if a function contains a write to a buffer.
Thus, we analyze a function to look for any write to a buffer. If a function does not
contain any write to a buffer then there is no need for the return address protection
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mechanism to be inserted. During our experimental evaluation of our scheme, we
have not yet come across a recursive function, which could cause issues for our
scheme, that required return address protection to be inserted.
3.5 Function Pointer Protection
One common attack method used by attackers is to overwrite a function
pointer so that when it is de-referenced, code of the attacker’s choosing will be
executed. In a binary executable, function pointers will appear as indirect calls.
Thus, another component of our scheme concentrates on protecting all indirect calls
and branches.
We have a scheme implemented which works correctly as will be seen in the
experimental results chapter. However, research within our group is currently on-
going that will convert all indirect calls and branches in a binary to direct calls and
branches. We will discuss how this affects our scheme after first describing what we
have implemented.
Our initial scheme adds checking code before all indirect calls and branches. A
global variable is declared in the data segment and its address is used as a boundary
value. The checks inserted before any indirect call or branch ensure that the target
of the indirect call or branch points to memory below the address of the global
boundary variable. If the target points above the address of this global bondary
variable then execution is halted.
With the new research occuring within our group, there will be no need to
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insert checks into a binary. Basically, an indirect call in an input binary will be
replaced by a large switch statement. This switch statement will contain a number
of cases which are direct calls. SecondWrite will determine by analysis what all the
valid targets of this indirect call are and each valid target will be a case in the switch
statement. Thus, if at runtime, the target is not valid, execution will be abort.
3.6 longjmp/setjmp Protection
The paired functions setjmp and longjmp provide a means to alter a program’s
control flow besides the usual subroutine call and return sequence. First, setjmp
saves the environment of the calling function into a data structure, and then longjmp
can use this structure to jump back to the point it was created, at the setjmp call.
A typical use for setjmp/longjmp is exception handling.
The data structure used by setjmp for saving the execution state is referred
to as a jmp buf. Within this structure, enough information is stored to restore a
calling environment. In particular, one member of this structure saves the value of
the program counter which is used when restoring the calling environment.
An attack method used by attackers is to overwrite the value of the member of
a jmp buf structure after a call to setjmp and before a call to longjmp. If an attacker
has the ability to change the value of the program counter member of the jmp buf
structure then when longjmp is called, control will be transferred to an address of
the attacker’s choosing.
Our method for dealing with attacks of this kind is as follows:
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• create a hash table within the global segment of the rewritten binary.
• after a call to setjmp use the current value of the program counter member of
the jmp buf structure as the key to the hash table.
• before a call to longjmp get the current value of the jmp buf structure that
will be used. Attempt to perform a lookup in the hash table for the value of
the program counter.
• if the lookup in the hash table fails, then the value of the program counter has
been modified and so we abort; otherwise execution continues
For now, the hash table created is of a fixed size. We have not experimented
with binaries that have many calls to setjmp and longjmp.
The above scheme effectively mitigates attacks of this kind as demonstrated
in the experimental results section.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter, we gave an overview of the binary rewriter developed within
our group. We also described each of the individual components which make up
our protection scheme. Together, these components can provide a high level of




In this chapter, we present a number of experimental results. First, we examine
the effectiveness of our security schemes as implemented in our binary rewriter on
a set of security benchmarks previously proposed for evaluating the effectivness
of buffer overflow defenses. Next, we examine the overheads of both the binary
rewriter and our security scheme. Finally, we examine how effective our scheme is
in protecting against a real-world attack.
4.1 Synthetic Results
In order to test how effective our scheme is, we utilized the benchmarks pro-
vided by Wilander and Kamkar [].
4.1.1 Benchmark Description
Wilander and Kamkar developed twenty buffer overflow attack forms in order
to evaluate the effectiveness of tools available at the time that aimed to stop buffer
overflows. An attack form is defined as a combination of a technique, location, and
an attack target. These terms are in turn defined by Wilander and Kamkar as:
• Technique - either the buffer is overflowed all the way to the attack target
or the buffer is overflowed to redirect a pointer to the target
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• Location - the types of location for the buffer overflow are the stack or the
heap/BSS/data segment
• Attack target - there are four targets - 1) the return address, 2) the old base
pointer, 3) function pointers, and 4) longjmp buffers
Considering all practically possible combinations gives the twenty attack forms
listed below:
1. Buffer overflow on the stack all the way to the target
(a) Return address
(b) Old base pointer
(c) Function pointer as a local variable
(d) Function pointer as parameter
(e) Longjmp buffer as local variable
(f) Longjmp buffer as function parameter
2. Buffer overflow on the heap/BSS/data segment all the way to the target
(a) Function pointer
(b) Longjmp buffer
3. Buffer overflow of a pointer on the stack and then pointing at target
(a) Return address
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(b) Old base pointer
(c) Function pointer as a local variable
(d) Function pointer as parameter
(e) Longjmp buffer as local variable
(f) Longjmp buffer as function parameter
4. Buffer overflow of a pointer on the heap/BSS/data segment and then pointing
at target
(a) Return address
(b) Old base pointer
(c) Function pointer as a local variable
(d) Function pointer as parameter
(e) Longjmp buffer as local variable
(f) Longjmp buffer as function parameter
Of the twenty attack forms, we obtained the source code to only eighteen of
these attack targets.
4.1.2 Methodology
We compiled the benchmarks using gcc 4.4. We compiled two versions of the
benchmarks - one version had the -fno-stack-protector flag while the other had the
-fstack-protector flag. The -fstack-protector flag creates a binary with the ProPolice
protection mechanism embedded within it.
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4.1.3 Results and Analysis
The results we recorded are shown in Table 4.1. In the table, ”prevented”
means that the process execution is unharmed. ”halted” means that the attack is
detected but the process is terminated. ”missed” means the attack was successful.
We refer to each attack form by the number assigned to it in Section 4.1.1.
As can be seen from the results in Table 4.1, the security inserted by our
binary rewriter surpasses what is achieved by the ProPolice mechanism in the GCC
compiler.
4.2 Overheads
4.2.1 Binary Rewriting Overhead
A subset of SPEC benchmarks and other benchmarks were selected to substan-
tiate the performance of our binary rewriter. The benchmarks were selected purely
at random, and are limited only by the criteria that they are correctly rewritten by
our still-early prototype. Table 4.2 lists the set of benchmarks which are used for
carrying out the experiments. All the benchmarks are compiled with GCC v4.4.1.
In the first experiment, all binaries executed correctly after rewriting thereby
demonstrating the robustness of our binary rewriter. We were able to correctly
apply the standard suite of LLVM optimization passes without any changes. These
include CFG simplification, global optimization, global dead-code elimination, inter-
procedural constant propagation, instruction combining, condition propagation, tail-
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Attack Form ProPolice Binary Rewriter
1 (a) halted halted
1 (b) missed on ¡= O1/prevented ¿ O1 prevented
1 (c) prevented halted
1 (d) prevented halted
1 (e) prevented halted
1 (f) missed halted
2 (a) missed halted
2 (b) missed halted
3 (a) prevented halted
3 (b) missed prevented
3 (c) prevented halted
3 (d) prevented halted
3 (e) prevented halted
3 (f) prevented halted
4 (a) missed halted
4 (b) missed prevented
4 (c) missed halted
4 (e) missed halted
Table 4.1: Results on the Wilander and Kamkar Benchmarks.
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Table 4.2: Application Characteristics
call elimination, induction variable simplification and selective loop unrolling.
Besides correctness, the next most important metrics are the run-time speedup
or overhead of the rewritten binaries versus the input binaries. Two scenarios are
of interest: when the input binaries were un-optimized, and when they were highly
optimized. Both scenarios are discussed in turn below.
Figure 4.1 shows the normalized run-time of each rewritten binary compared
to an input binary produced using GCC with no optimization (-O0 flag). We obtain
an average improvement of 31% in execution time on our benchmarks with an im-
provement of over 40% in some cases. This result shows that our rewriter is useful
for binaries that are not highly optimized, such as legacy binaries from older com-



























































Figure 4.1: Normalized runtime of rewritten binary as compared to input
binary (runtime=1.0) that is un-optimized
compilers. In most cases, after rewriting we raised the performance close to that
of an optimized binary produced directly by GCC, showing the effectiveness of our
approach.
Next, we study the performance of our rewriter on already optimized binaries.
Figure 4.2 shows the normalized execution time of each rewritten binary compared to
an input binary produced using GCC with the highest available level of optimization
(-O3 flag). In this case, the results are mixed, with most benchmarks nearly breaking
even or showing a small slowdown, one benchmark showing a larger slowdown of
13%, and one benchmark actually shows a speedup of 10%. The average is 4%
slowdown.



























































Figure 4.2: Normalized runtime of rewritten binary as compared to input
binary (runtime=1.0) that is optimized
good result for the following three reasons:
1. our initial goal was not necessarily to get a speedup, but to generate correct
IR without without introducing too much overhead. This would enable the IR
to be a starting point for various custom compiler transformations we wanted
to perform thereafter, such as automatic parallelization or security as covered
in this thesis. Ultimately, these optimizations determine the utility of the
rewriter.
2. these numbers represent our first cut implementation devoid of any attempt
at producing a better IR more geared towards optimization. We believe these
numbers can be substantially improved with more detailed IR and are explor-
ing several related avenues.
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3. we have currently not implemented any custom serial optimizations that are
likely to improve performance further, such as the inter-procedural versions of
common sub-expression elimination and loop-invariant code motion, changing
the compiler-enforced calling convention for registers for better run-time, and
more aggressive inlining. We believe these optimizations hold promise as the
inter-procedural optimization abilities of current compilers are very limited
compared to their intra-procedural performance.
One additional advantage of the binary rewriter is that it accumlates optimiza-
tions accross two compilers - rewritten binaries have an optimization if it is either
present in the compiler that produced the input binary, or in the rewriter. In our
case, if either GCC or LLVM had an optimization, the output binary should have
it. This is why, for example, one of our rewritten binaries (libquantum) had a 10%
speedup versus the input binary. Although GCC with the -O3 optimization flag is
known to produce good code, in some cases it missed promoting structure fields to
registers whereas LLVM did, explaining the speedup in libquantum. With better
IR and more aggressive optimizations, we expect to see more consistent speedups in
output binaries in the future.
4.2.2 Security Related Overheads
We measured the overhead of the security schemes we implemented. These
















































Original Runtime Overhead with security checks
Figure 4.3: Runtime overhead of rewritten binaries after inserting security checks.
4.3 Real World Attacks
Ultimately, the success of the scheme presented in this thesis is only valuable
if it is applicable to real-world attacks i.e. whether it can prevent attacks that have
been observed in practice. In this section, we reproduce a real-world attack and
demonstrate that our rewriter halts this attack.
A HTTP server, GHTTPD, has a stack buffer overflow vulnerability in its
logging function. We produced an exploit for this server which overflows a stack-
based buffer and corrupts the return address.
Using the return address protection component of our scheme, we were able to
rewrite the GHTTPD server, add protection of the return address and prevent the
attack which uses the buffer overflow vulnerability to corrupt the return address.
When our protection scheme is enabled, the return address corruption is detected
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and the application is aborted.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
We presented a scheme developed using binary rewriting that can defend
against a number of buffer overflow attacks. Our scheme is practical and easy to
deploy with the only factor limiting deployment right now is maturity of the binary
rewriter.
We demonstrated the effectiveness of our scheme using the benchmarks devel-
oped by Wilander and Kamkar by successfully defending against all attack methods
in those benchmarks. A real-world attack on a lightweight HTTP server was also
mitigated using our scheme.
Future work involves extending the binary rewriter to work on larger binaries
and testing against more real-world attacks. Interesting avenues for future research
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